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Abstract
Assessing network security is a complex and difficult task.
Attack graphs have been proposed as a tool to help network
administrators understand the potential weaknesses of their
networks. However, a problem has not yet been addressed
by previous work on this subject; namely, how to actually
execute and validate the attack paths resulting from the anal-
ysis of the attack graph. In this paper we present a complete
PDDL representation of an attack model, and an implemen-
tation that integrates a planner into a penetration testing tool.
This allows to automatically generate attack paths for pene-
tration testing scenarios, and to validate these attacks by exe-
cuting the corresponding actions -including exploits- against
the real target network. We present an algorithm for trans-
forming the information present in the penetration testing tool
to the planning domain, and we show how the scalability is-
sues of attack graphs can be solved using current planners.
We include an analysis of the performance of our solution,
showing how our model scales to medium-sized networks and
the number of actions available in current penetration testing
tools.
1 Introduction
The last 10 years have witnessed the development of a new
kind of information security tool: the penetration testing
framework. These tools facilitate the work of network pene-
tration testers, and make the assessment of network security
more accessible to non-experts. The main tools available
are the open source project Metasploit, and the commercial
products Immunity Canvas and Core Impact (Burns et al.
2007).
The main difference between these tools and network se-
curity scanners such as Nessus or Retina is that pentesting
frameworks have the ability to launch real exploits for vul-
nerabilities, helping to expose risk by conducting an attack
in the same way a real external attacker would (Arce and
McGraw 2004).
Penetration tests involve successive phases of information
gathering, where the pentesting tool helps the user gather
information about the network under attack (available hosts,
their operating systems and open ports, and the services run-
ning in them); and exploiting, where the user actively tries
to compromise specific hosts in the network. When an ex-
ploit launched against a vulnerable machine is successful,
the machine becomes compromised and can be used to per-
form further information gathering, or to launch subsequent
attacks. This shift in the source of the attacker’s actions is
called pivoting. Newly compromised machines can serve as
the source for posterior information gathering, and this new
information might reveal previously unknown vulnerabili-
ties, so the phases of information gathering and exploiting
usually succeed one another.
As pentesting tools have evolved and have become more
complex, covering new attack vectors; and shipping increas-
ing numbers of exploits and information gathering mod-
ules, the problem of controlling the pentesting framework
successfully became an important question. A computer-
generated plan for an attack would isolate the user from
the complexity of selecting suitable exploits for the hosts
in the target network. In addition, a suitable model to rep-
resent these attacks would help to systematize the knowl-
edge gained during manual penetration tests performed by
expert users, making pentesting frameworks more accessi-
ble to non-experts. Finally, the possibility of incorporating
the attack planning phase to the pentesting framework would
allow for optimizations based on exploit running time, reli-
ability, or impact on Intrusion Detection Systems.
Our work on the attack planning problem applied to pen-
testing began in 2003 with the construction of a conceptual
model of an attack, distinguishing assets, actions and goals
(Futoransky et al. 2003; Richarte 2003; Arce and Richarte
2003). In this attack model, the assets represent both infor-
mation and the modifications in the network that an attacker
may need to obtain during an intrusion, whereas the actions
are the basic steps of an attack, such as running a particular
exploit against a target host. This model was designed to be
realistic from an attacker’s point of view, and contemplates
the fact that the attacker has an initial incomplete knowledge
of the network, and therefore information gathering should
be considered as part of the attack.
Since the actions have requirements (preconditions) and
results, given a goal, a graph of the actions/assets that lead
to this goal can be constructed. This graph is related to
the attack graphs1 studied in (Phillips and Swiler 1998;
Jajodia, Noel, and OBerry 2005; Noel et al. 2009) and many
1Nodes in an attack graph identify a stage of the attack, while
edges represent individual steps in the attack.
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others. In (Lippmann and Ingols 2005) the authors reviewed
past papers on attack graphs, and observed that the “first
major limitation of these studies is that most attack graph
algorithms have only been able to generate attack graphs on
small networks with fewer than 20 hosts”.
In medium-sized networks, building complete attack
graphs quickly becomes unfeasible (their size increases ex-
ponentially with the number of machines and available ac-
tions). To deal with the attack planning problem, a pro-
posed approach (Sarraute and Weil 2008; Sarraute 2009) is
to translate the model into a PDDL representation and use
classical planning algorithms to find attack paths. Planning
algorithms manage to find paths in the attack graph with-
out constructing it completely, thus helping to avoid the
combinatorial explosion (Blum and Furst 1997). A simi-
lar approach was presented at SecArt’09 (Ghosh and Ghosh
2009), but the authors’ model is less expressive than the one
used in this work, as their objective was to use the attack
paths to build a minimal attack graph, and not to carry out
these attacks against real networks.
In this paper we present an implementation of these
ideas. We have developed modules that integrate a pentest-
ing framework with an external planner, and execute the re-
sulting plans back in the pentesting framework, against a
real network. We believe our implementation proves the
feasability of automating the attack phases of a penetra-
tion test, and allows to think about moving up to auto-
mate the whole process. We show how our model, and its
PDDL representation, scale to hundreds of target nodes and
available exploits, numbers that can be found when assess-
ing medium-sized networks with current pentesting frame-
works.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we present
a high-level description of our solution, describing the steps
needed to integrate a planner with a penetration testing
framework. Section 3 describes our PDDL representation
in detail, explaining how the “real world” view that we take
forces a particular implementation of the attack planning
problem in PDDL. Section 4 presents the results of our scal-
ability testing, showing how our model manages medium-
sized networks using current planners. Section 5 reviews
related work, and Section 6 closes the paper and outlines
future work.
2 Architecture of our Solution
In this section we describe the components of our solution,
and how they fit together to automate an attack. Figure 1
shows the relationship between these different components.
The penetration testing framework is a tool that allows the
user/attacker to execute exploits and other pre/post exploita-
tion modules against the target network. Our implementa-
tion is based on Core Impact2. The planner is a tool that
takes as input the description of a domain and a scenario, in
PDDL3. The domain contains the definition of the available
2As mentioned in the previous section, Metasploit is an open-
source alternative.
3Refer to (Fox and Long 2003) for a description of the PDDL
planning language.
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Figure 1: Architecture of our solution.
actions in the model, and the scenario contains the defini-
tion of the objects (networks, hosts, and their characteris-
tics), and the goal which has to be solved.
The attack workspace contains the information about the
current attack or penetration test. In particular, the discov-
ered networks and hosts, information about their operat-
ing systems, open/closed ports, running services and com-
promised machines. In the current version of our solution
we assume that the workspace has this network informa-
tion available, and that no network information gathering is
needed to generate a solvable plan. We will address this lim-
itation in Section 6 when we discuss future work.
Transform algorithm
The transform algorithm generates the PDDL representation
of the attack planning problem, including the initial condi-
tions, the operators (PDDL actions), and the goal. From
the pentesting framework we extract the description of the
operators, in particular the requirements and results of the
exploits, which will make up most of the available actions
in the PDDL representation. This is encoded in the do-
main.pddl file, along with the predicates and types (which
only depend on the details of our model).
From the attack workspace we extract the information that
constitutes the initial conditions for the planner: networks,
machines, operating systems, ports and running services.
This is encoded in the problem.pddl file, together with the
goal of the attack, which will usually be the compromise of
a particular machine.
A common characteristic of pentesting frameworks is that
they provide an incomplete view of the network under at-
tack. The pentester has to infer the structure of the network
using the information that he sees from each compromised
machine. The transform algorithm takes this into account,
receiving extra information regarding host connectivity.
Planner
The PDDL description is given as input to the planner. The
advantage of using the PDDL language is that we can exper-
iment with different planners and determine which best fits
our particular problem. We have evaluated our model us-
ing both SGPlan (Chen, Wah, and Hsu 2006) and Metric-FF
(Hoffmann 2002).
The planner is run from inside the pentesting framework,
as a pluggable module of the framework that we call Plan-
nerRunner. The output of the planner is a plan, a sequence
of actions that lead to the completion of the goal, if all the ac-
tions are successful. We make this distinction because even
with well-tested exploit code, not all exploits launched are
successful. The plan is given as feedback to the pentesting
framework, and executed against the real target network.
3 The PDDL Representation in Detail
The PDDL description language serves as the bridge be-
tween the pentesting tool and the planner. Since exploits
have strict platform and connectivity requirements, failing to
accurately express those requirements in the PDDL model
would result in plans that cannot be executed against real
networks. This forces our PDDL representation of the at-
tack planning problem to be quite verbose.
On top of that, we take advantage of the optimization abil-
ities of planners that understand numerical effects4, and have
the PDDL actions affect different metrics commonly associ-
ated with penetration testing such as running time, probabil-
ity of success or possibility of detection (stealth).
We will focus on the description of the domain.pddl
file, which contains the PDDL representation of the attack
model. We will not delve into the details of the problem.pddl
file, since it consists of a list of networks and machines, de-
scribed using the predicates to be presented in this section.
The PDDL requirements of the representation are :typ-
ing, so that predicates can have types, and :fluents, to use
numerical effects. We will first describe the types available
in the model, and then list the predicates that use these types.
We will continue by describing the model-related actions
that make this predicates true, and then we will show an ex-
ample of an action representing an exploit. We close this
section with an example PDDL plan for a simple scenario.
Types
Table 1 shows a list of the types that we used. Half of the
object types are dedicated to describing in detail the operat-
ing systems of the hosts, since the successful execution of an
exploit depends on being able to detect the specifics of the
OS.
network operating system
host OS version
port OS edition
port set OS build
application OS servicepack
agent OS distro
privileges kernel version
Table 1: List of object types
4Numerical effects allow the actions in the PDDL representa-
tion to increase the value of different metrics defined in the PDDL
scenario. The planner can then be told to find a plan that minimizes
a linear function of these metrics.
Predicates
The following are the predicates used in our model of at-
tacks. Since exploits also have non-trivial connectivity re-
quirements, we chose to have a detailed representation of
network connectivity in PDDL. We need to be able to ex-
press how hosts are connected to networks, and the fact that
exploits may need both IP and TCP or UDP connectivity
between the source and target hosts, usually on a particular
TCP or UDP port. These predicates express the different
forms of connectivity:
(connected_to_network ?s - host ?n - network)
(IP_connectivity ?s - host ?t - host)
(TCP_connectivity ?s - host ?t - host ?p - port)
(TCP_listen_port ?h - host ?p - port)
(UDP_listen_port ?h - host ?p - port)
These predicates describe the operating system and ser-
vices of a host:
(has_OS ?h - host ?os - operating_system)
(has_OS_version ?h - host ?osv - OS_version)
(has_OS_edition ?h - host ?ose - OS_edition)
(has_OS_build ?h - host ?osb - OS_build)
(has_OS_servicepack ?h - host ?ossp - OS_servicepack)
(has_OS_distro ?h - host ?osd - OS_distro)
(has_kernel_version ?h - host ?kv - kernel_version)
(has_architecture ?h - host ?a - OS_architecture)
(has_application ?h - host ?p - application)
Actions
We require some “model-related” actions that make true the
aforementioned predicates in the right cases.
(:action IP_connect
:parameters (?s - host ?t - host)
:precondition (and (compromised ?s)
(exists (?n - network)
(and (connected_to_network ?s ?n)
(connected_to_network ?t ?n))))
:effect (IP_connectivity ?s ?t)
)
(:action TCP_connect
:parameters (?s - host ?t - host ?p - port)
:precondition (and (compromised ?s)
(IP_connectivity ?s ?t)
(TCP_listen_port ?t ?p))
:effect (TCP_connectivity ?s ?t ?p)
)
(:action Mark_as_compromised
:parameters (?a - agent ?h - host)
:precondition (installed ?a ?h)
:effect (compromised ?h)
)
Two hosts on the same network possess IP connectivity,
and two hosts have TCP (or UDP) connectivity if they have
IP connectivity and the target host has the correct TCP (or
UDP) port open. Moreover, when an exploit is successful an
agent is installed on the target machine, which allows con-
trol over that machine. An installed agent is hard evidence
that the machine is vulnerable, so it marks the machine as
compromised5.
The penetration testing framework we used has an exten-
sive test suite that collects information regarding running
time for many exploit modules. We obtained average run-
ning times from this data and used that information as the
numeric effect of exploit actions in PDDL. The metric to
minimize in our PDDL scenarios is therefore the total run-
ning time of the complete attack.
Finally, this is an example of an action, an exploit that
will attempt to install an agent on target host t from an agent
previously installed on the source host s. To be successful,
this exploit requires that the target runs a specific OS, has
the service ovtrcd running and listening on port 5053.
(:action HP_OpenView_Remote_Buffer_Overflow_Exploit
:parameters (?s - host ?t - host)
:precondition (and (compromised ?s)
(and (has_OS ?t Windows)
(has_OS_edition ?t Professional)
(has_OS_servicepack ?t Sp2)
(has_OS_version ?t WinXp)
(has_architecture ?t I386))
(has_service ?t ovtrcd)
(TCP_connectivity ?s ?t port5053)
)
:effect(and (installed_agent ?t high_privileges)
(increase (time) 10)
))
In our PDDL representation there are several versions
of this exploit, one for each specific operating system sup-
ported by the exploit. For example, another supported sys-
tem for this exploit looks like this:
(and (has_OS ?t Solaris)
(has_OS_version ?t V_10)
(has_architecture ?t Sun4U))
The main part of the domain.pddl file is devoted to the
description of the actions. In our sample scenarios, this file
has up to 28,000 lines and includes up to 1,800 actions. The
last part of the domain.pddl file is the list of constants that
appear in the scenario, including the names of the applica-
tions, the list of port numbers and operating system version
details.
An attack plan
We end this section with an example plan obtained by run-
ning Metric-FF on a scenario generated with this model. The
goal of the scenario is to compromise host 10.0.5.12 in the
target network. This network is similar to the test network
that we will describe in detail in Section 4. The plan re-
quires four pivoting steps and executes five different exploits
in total, though we only show the first6 and last ones for
space reasons. The exploits shown are real-world exploits
currently present in the pentesting framework.
5Depending on the exploit used, the agent might have regular
user privileges, or superuser (root) privileges. Certain local exploits
allow a low-level (user) agent to be upgraded to a high-level agent,
so we model this by having two different privileges PDDL objects.
6The localagent object represents the pentesting framework
running in the machine of the user/attacker.
0: Mark_as_compromised localagent localhost
1: IP_connect localhost 10.0.1.1
2: TCP_connect localhost 10.0.1.1 port80
3: Phpmyadmin Server_databases Remote Code Execution
localhost 10.0.1.1
4: Mark_as_compromised 10.0.1.1 high_privileges
...
14: Mark_as_compromised 10.0.4.2 high_privileges
15: IP_connect 10.0.4.2 10.0.5.12
16: TCP_connect 10.0.4.2 10.0.5.12 port445
17: Novell Client NetIdentity Agent Buffer Overflow
10.0.4.2 10.0.5.12
18: Mark_as_compromised 10.0.5.12 high_privileges
4 Performance and Scalability Evaluation
This model, and its representation in PDDL, are intended to
be used to plan attacks against real networks, and execute
them using a pentesting framework. To verify that our pro-
posed solution scales up to the domains and scenarios we
need to address in real-world cases, we carried out exten-
sive performance and scalability testing – to see how far we
could take the attack model and PDDL representation with
current planners. We focused our performance evaluation on
four metrics:
• Number of machines in the attacked network
• Number of pivoting steps in the attack
• Number of available exploits in the pentesting suite
• Number of individual predicates that must be fulfilled to
accomplish the goal
The rationale behind using these metrics is that we needed
our solution to scale up reasonably with regard to all of them.
For example, a promising use of planning algorithms for at-
tack planning lies in scenarios where there are a consider-
able number of machines to take into account, which could
be time-consuming for a human attacker.
Moreover, many times a successful penetration test needs
to reach the innermost levels of a network, sequentially ex-
ploiting many machines in order to reach one which might
hold sensitive information. We need our planning solution
to be able to handle these cases where many pivoting steps
are needed.
Pentesting suites are constantly updated with exploits for
new vulnerabilities, so that users can test their systems
against the latest risks. The pentesting tool that we used
currently7 has about 700 exploits, of which almost 300 are
the remote exploits that get included in the PDDL domain.
Each remote exploit is represented as a different operator for
each target operating system, so our PDDL domains usually
have about 1800 operators, and our solution needs to cope
with that input.
Finally, another promising use of planning algorithms for
attack planning is the continuous monitoring of a network by
means of a constant pentest. In this case we need to be able
to scale to goals that involve compromising many machines.
7As of March, 2010.
We decided to use the planners Metric-FF8 (Hoffmann
2002) and SGPlan9 (Chen, Wah, and Hsu 2006) since we
consider them to be representative of the state of the art in
classical planners. The original FF planner was the base-
line planner for IPC’0810. Metric-FF adds numerical effects
to the FF planner. We modified the reachability analysis in
Metric-FF to use type information, as in FF, to obtain better
memory usage.
SGPlan combines Metric-FF as a base planner with a con-
straint partitioning scheme which allows it to divide the main
planning problem in subproblems; these subproblems are
solved with a modified version of Metric-FF, and the indi-
vidual solutions combined to obtain a plan for the original
problem. This method, according to the authors, has the po-
tential to significantly reduce the complexity of the original
problem (Chen, Wah, and Hsu 2006). It was successfully
used in (Ghosh and Ghosh 2009).
Generating the test scenarios
We tested both real and simulated networks, generating
the test scenarios using the same pentesting framework we
would later use to attack them. For the large-scale test-
ing, we made use of a network simulator (Futoransky et al.
2009). This simulator allows to build sizable networks11,
but still view each machine independently and, for example,
execute distinct system calls in each of them. The simulator
integrates tightly with the pentesting framework, to the point
where the framework is oblivious to the fact that the network
under attack is simulated and not real.
This allowed us to use the pentesting tool to carry out
all the steps of the test, including the information gather-
ing stage of the attack. Once the information gathering was
complete, we converted the attack workspace to PDDL us-
ing our transform tool.
We generated two types of networks for the performance
evaluation. To evaluate the scalability in terms of number
of machines, number of operators, and number of goals;
the network consists of five subnets with varying numbers
of machines, all joined to one main network to which the
user/attacker initially has access. Figure 2 shows the high-
level structure of this simulated network.
To evaluate the scalability in terms of the number of piv-
oting steps needed to reach the goal, we constructed a test
network where the attacker and the target machine are sep-
arated by an increasing number of routers, and each subnet-
work in between has a small number of machines.
The network simulator allows us to specify many de-
tails about the simulated machines, so in both networks, the
subnetworks attached to the innermost routers contain four
types of machines: Linux desktops and servers, and Win-
dows desktops and servers. Table 2 shows the configuration
for each of the four machine types, and the share of each
type in the network. For server cases, each machine ran-
domly removes one open port from the canonical list shown
8Latest version available (with additional improvements).
9SGPlan version 5.22.
10The International Planning Competition, 2008.
11We tested up to 1000 nodes in the simulator.
. . .
. . .
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Figure 2: Test network for scalability evaluation.
Machine type OS version Share Open ports
Windows desktop Windows XP SP3 50% 139, 445
Windows server Windows 2003 Server SP2 14% 25, 80, 110, 139,
443, 445, 3389
Linux desktop Ubuntu 8.04 or 8.10 27% 22
Linux server Debian 4.0 9% 21, 22, 23, 25,
80, 110, 443
Table 2: List of machine types for the test networks
in the table, so that all machines are not equal and thus not
equally exploitable.
Results
As we expected, both planners generated the same plans in
all cases, not taking into account plans in which goals were
composite and the same actions could be executed in dif-
ferent orders. This is reasonable given that SGPlan uses
Metric-FF as its base planner. We believe that the perfor-
mance and scalability results are more interesting, since a
valid plan for an attack path is a satisfactory result in itself.
Figures 3 to 10 show how running time and memory con-
sumption scale for both planners, with respect to the four
metrics considered12. Recall that, as explained in Section 3,
each exploit maps to many PDDL actions.
As illustrated by Figures 3 and 4, both running time and
memory consumption increase superlinearly with the num-
ber of machines in the network. We were not able to find
exact specifications for the time and memory complexities
of Metric-FF or SGPlan, though we believe this is because
heuristics make it difficult to calculate a complexity that
holds in normal cases. Nonetheless, our model, coupled
12Testing was performed on a Core i5 750 2.67 GHz machine
with 8 GB of RAM, running 64-bit Ubuntu Linux; the planners
were 32-bit programs.
Figure 3: Running time, increasing number of machines.
(Fixed values: 1600 actions, 1 pivoting step).
Figure 4: Memory usage, increasing number of machines.
with the SGPlan planner, allows to plan an attack in a net-
work with 480 nodes in 25 seconds and using less than 4 GB
of RAM. This makes attack planning practical for pentests
in medium-sized networks.
Moving on to the scalability with regard to the depth of
the attack (Figures 5 and 6), it was surprising to verify that
memory consumption is constant even as we increase the
depth of the attack to twenty pivoting steps, which gener-
ates a plan of more than sixty steps. Running time increases
slowly, although with a small number of steps the behaviour
is less predictable. The model is therefore not constrained in
terms of the number of pivoting steps.
With regard to the number of operators (i.e. exploits)
(Figures 7 and 8), both running time and memory consump-
tion increase almost linearly; however, running time spikes
in the largest cases. Doubling the number of operators, from
720 to 1440 (from 120 to 240 available exploits), increases
running time in 163% for Metric-FF and 124% for SG-
Plan. Memory consumption, however, increases only 46%
for Metric-FF, and 87% for SGPlan. In this context, the
number of available exploits is not a limiting factor for the
model.
Interestingly, these three tests also verify many of the
Figure 5: Running time, increasing number of pivoting
steps. (Fixed values: 1600 actions, 120 machines).
Figure 6: Memory usage, increasing number of pivoting
steps.
claims made by the authors of SGPlan. We see that the
constraint partition used by their planner manages to reduce
both running time and memory consumption, in some cases
by significant amounts (like in Figure 6).
The results for the individual number of predicates in the
overall goal (Figures 9 and 10) are much more surprising.
While SGPlan runs faster than Metric-FF in most of the
cases, Metric-FF consumes significantly less memory in al-
most half of them. We believe that as the goal gets more
complex (the largest case we tested requests the individual
compromise of 100 machines), SGPlan’s constraint partition
strategy turns into a liability, not allowing a clean separa-
tion of the problem into subproblems. By falling back to
Metric-FF our model can solve, in under 6 seconds and us-
ing slightly more than 1 GB of RAM, attack plans where
half of the machines of a 200-machine network are to be
compromised.
5 Related work
Work on attack modeling applied to penetration testing
had its origin in the possibility of programmatically con-
trolling pentesting tools such as Metasploit or Core Im-
Figure 7: Running time, increasing number of actions.
(Fixed values: 200 machines, 1 pivoting step).
Figure 8: Memory usage, increasing number of actions.
pact. This model led to the use of attack graphs. Earlier
work on attack graphs such as (Phillips and Swiler 1998;
Ritchey and Ammann 2000; Sheyner et al. 2002) were based
on the complete enumeration of attack states, which grows
exponentially with the number of actions and machines. As
we mentioned in Section 1 the survey of (Lippmann and In-
gols 2005) shows that the major limitations of past studies
of attack graphs is their lack of scalability to medium-sized
networks.
One notable exception is the Topological Vulnerabil-
ity Analysis (TVA) project conducted in George Mason
University described in (Jajodia, Noel, and OBerry 2005;
Noel and Jajodia 2005; Noel et al. 2009) and other papers,
which has been designed to work in real-size networks. The
main differences between our approach and TVA are the fol-
lowing:
• Input. In TVA the model is populated with information
from third party vulnerability scanners such as Nessus,
Retina and FoundScan, from databases of vulnerabilities
such as CVE and OSVDB and other software. All this
information has to be integrated, and will suffer from the
drawbacks of each information source, in particular from
the false positives generated by the vulnerability scanners
Figure 9: Running time, increasing number of predicates in
the goal. (Fixed values: 200 machines, 1 pivoting step for
each compromised machine, 1600 actions).
Figure 10: Memory usage, increasing number of predicates
in the goal.
about potential vulnerabilities.
In our approach the conceptual model and the information
about the target network are extracted from a consistent
source: the pentesting framework exploits and workspace.
The vulnerability information of an exploit is very pre-
cise: the attacker can execute it in the real network to ac-
tually compromise systems.
• Monotonicity. TVA assumes that the attacker’s control
over the network is monotonic (Ammann, Wijesekera,
and Kaushik 2002). In particular, this implies that TVA
cannot model Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, or the fact
that an unsuccessful exploit may crash the target service
or machine. It is interesting to remark that the monotonic-
ity assumption is the same used by FF (Hoffmann 2001)
to create a relaxed version of the planning problem, and
use it as a heuristic to guide the search through the attack
graph. By relying on the planner to do the search, we do
not need to make this restrictive assumption.
6 Summary and Future Work
(Futoransky et al. 2003) proposed a model of computer net-
work attacks which was designed to be realistic from an at-
tacker’s point of view. We have shown in this paper that this
model scales up to medium-sized networks: it can be used
to automate attacks (and penetration tests) against networks
with hundreds of machines.
The solution presented shows that it is not necessary to
build the complete attack graph (one of the major limita-
tions of earlier attack graph studies). Instead we rely on
planners such as Metric-FF and SGPlan to selectively ex-
plore the state space in order to find attack paths.
We have successfully integrated these planners with a
pentesting framework, which allowed us to execute and vali-
date the resulting plans against a test bench of scenarios. We
presented the details of how to transform the information
contained in the pentesting tool to the planning domain13.
One important question that remains as future work on
this subject is how to deal with incomplete knowledge of the
target network. The architecture that we presented supports
running non-classical planners, so one possible approach is
to use probabilistic planning techniques, where actions have
different outcomes with associated probabilities. For exam-
ple, a step of the attack plan could be to discover the oper-
ating system details of a particular host, so the outcome of
this action would be modeled as a discrete probability distri-
bution.
Another approach would be to build a “metaplanner” that
generates hypotheses with respect to the missing bits of in-
formation about the network, and uses the planner to test
those hypotheses. Continuing the previous example, the
metaplanner would assume that the operating system of the
host was Windows and request the planner to compromise it
as such. The metaplanner would then test the resulting plan
in the real network, and verify or discard the hypothesis.
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